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 Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are susceptible to a 
wide range of security attacks in hostile environments due to the 
limited processing and energy capabilities of sensor nodes. 
Consequently, the use of WSNs in mission critical applications 
requires reliable detection and fast recovery from these attacks. 
While much research has been devoted to detecting security attacks, 
very little attention has been paid yet to the recovery task. In this 
paper, we present a novel mechanism that is based on dynamic 
network reclustering and node reprogramming for recovering from 
node compromise. In response to node compromise, the proposed 
recovery approach reclusters the network excluding compromised 
nodes; thus allowing normal network operation while initiating node 
recovery procedures. We propose a novel reclustering algorithm that 
uses 2-hop neighbourhood information for this purpose. For node 
reprogramming we propose the modified Deluge protocol. The 
proposed node recovery mechanism is both decentralized and 
scalable. Moreover, we demonstrate through its implementation on a 
TelosB-based sensor network testbed that the proposed recovery 
method performs well in a low-resource WSN.  
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I.              INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks are deployed in many mission 
critical applications. With their development, various novel 
security attacks have appeared. The aims of these attacks are 
usually to take over nodes in the network, destroy nodes or to 
disrupt data flow. Efficient detection and recovery from such 
attacks have become major challenges in protecting sensor 
networks from such compromises [1, 2].  
WSNs are characterized by random deployments leading to a 
flat network topology; but clustering of sensors leading to a 
hierarchical routing structure [3-8] can provide security 
advantages in enabling localisation and isolation of an attack as 
well as in responding to an attack quickly. To achieve recovery, 
the objective is to use clustering in an efficient manner in order to 
maintain the network’s ability to operate for as long as possible 
even when some nodes are compromised. However, for a 
clustering scheme to be useful for practical applications in WSNs, 
it must be suited to the memory and processing capabilities of low 
resourced sensor devices. From a security perspective, it should 
enable recovery from an attack by reorganisation of the network 
structure in order to minimise the impact of node compromise on 
network resources and operation. This is the main motivation for 
our work. 
In this paper, we present a novel recovery approach that 
includes a clustering algorithm for low-resource stationary 
wireless sensor networks in conjunction with a reprogramming 
mechanism to enable efficient recovery from node compromise 
while maintaining the operation of the network.  The recovery 
approach takes into account the state of individual sensors to 
ensure energy-sensitive cluster and network organization.   
The contribution of this work can be summarized as: 
• A recovery mechanism that combines network reclustering 
and node reprogramming to dynamically re-organize the network 
into a clustered network architecture that does not include 
compromised nodes: thus permitting the network to be 
operational while initiating node reprogramming procedures to 
recover compromised nodes. 
• Demonstration that the proposed recovery mechanism 
comprising of network reclustering and node reprogramming can 
be implemented efficiently on a sensor network testbed using 
TelosB motes.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After an 
overview on related work in Section II, we present our recovery 
mechanism in Section III. In Section IV, the benefits of the 
proposed scheme are discussed by means of experimental results, 
and Section V concludes the paper.      
II. 1B           RELATED WORK 
In this section, we present a brief overview of clustering and 
reprogramming in wireless sensor networks. 
Clustering was originally developed with the aim of 
introducing a hierarchical structure: clusters are subsets of nodes 
in the WSN managed by a member of the subset referred to as an 
‘aggregator’. Mirkovic et al. [3] organize a large-scale sensor 
network by maintaining a dynamic multicast tree-based 
forwarding hierarchy that allows multiple sinks to obtain data 
from a sensor source. This method consumes significant power 
which leads to reduced network lifetime. Krishnan and 
Starobinski [4] present two algorithms that produce clusters of 
B. Li1, R. Doss1, Member IEEE, L.M. Batten1, Senior Member, IEEE, and W. Schott2, Senior Member, IEEE 
1School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Australia  
2IBM Research GmbH, Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland      
Fast Recovery from Node Compromise in 
Wireless Sensor Networks 
978-1-4244-6273-5/09/$26.00 ©2009 IEEE
Authorized licensed use limited to: DEAKIN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. Downloaded on April 09,2010 at 05:54:01 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
 bounded size and low diameter by having nodes allocate local 
growth budgets to neighbours. However, the cluster size can be 
very large which cannot provide for our purposes efficient 
recovery at the recovery stage. Meguerdichian et al. [5] have 
formulated the exposure and coverage properties of sensor 
networks using computational geometry-based techniques such as 
the Voronoi diagram and the Delaunay Triangulation. However, 
this approach is centralized and difficult to implement across the 
WSN. Slijepcevic and Potkonjak [6] propose a heuristic that 
organizes the sensor network by selecting mutually exclusive sets 
of sensor nodes that together completely cover the monitored 
area. Heinzelman et al. [7] proposed an alternative 
clustering-based approach, called LEACH (Low-Energy 
Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy), with the aim of sharing the 
energy load across clusters. The LEACH protocol implements a 
load-balancing procedure that allows different nodes to become 
aggregators at different times. The assumption that all the sensors 
have the ability to communicate with the base station directly 
makes LEACH impractical for large scale sensor networks.  Wu 
[8] has proposed the enhanced multi-point relay (EMPR) 
algorithm to efficiently partition a WSN with a flat topology into a 
hierarchical network by identifying a set of multi-point relays that 
can be shown to be fully connected thus forming a connected 
dominating set (CDS)F1F of network nodes. We use EMPR as the 
basis of our clustering algorithm.  
There has also been much work on reprogramming in WSNs 
as a solution to failed message reception or in order to install 
updated code. Over the air programming (OAP) of sensor nodes is 
attractive for recovery techniques. The process of over the air 
reprogramming can be generalised into the following steps – (1) 
encoding, (2) dissemination and (3) decoding [2]. In the first step, 
the control node (base station or aggregator) prepares the code 
packets to be distributed. The code is disseminated by the control 
node in the second step which is followed by the sensor device 
receiving the code packets, decoding and storing the code packets. 
At this point, within the node, the network programming module 
rebuilds the program code and calls the boot loader to load the 
code into program memory. 
In considering our own approach to reprogramming, we 
considered the best current approaches. Current methods for over 
the air reprogramming include XNP from Crossbow [2], Deluge 
[2], MOAP [9] and incremental programming [10]. Each of these 
methods is designed for either multi-hop or single-hop 
reprogramming of all nodes in a deployment. XNP broadcasts the 
program code over a single-hop, Deluge makes use of epidemic 
dissemination over multi-hops to reprogram all nodes in the 
network and MOAP supports multi-hop programming. 
Incremental programming targets components of the code in the 
node that need to be changed, and then reprograms using only 
former or updated versions of these components. In order to do 
this, it applies the Rsync algorithm [11] to sensor nodes.  
 
1 A CDS is defined as a subset of nodes of a network, where every node is either 
in the subset or a neighbor of a node in the subset, and the graph introduced by the 
subset is fully connected. 
None of these methods enables the reprogramming of a 
specific node either over a single-hop or multi-hop and hence are 
not directly suited for node recovery purposes. 
As the basis for our design of a reprogramming protocol for 
individual nodes, we chose Deluge based on the fact that it aims to 
increase the transmission throughput by using optimisation 
techniques such as adjusting the packet transmission rate and 
spatial multiplexing. We modified the Deluge protocol to 
selectively reprogram nodes that have been identified as 
compromised. The descriptions of the modification and the 
performance of the redesigned Deluge protocol as evaluated 
through field experiments using our test bed is presented in 
Section V. 
III. 2BNOVEL RECOVERY MECHANISM 
A. 6BPreliminaries 
WSNs can be built in a number of ways depending on the 
desired application [1]. Often, several types of nodes are present, 
classified in terms of the role they play, such as gathering data, 
analyzing data, or deploying applications.  
An intuitive analysis of the sensor network activities of a 
simple network leads to mapping tasks to roles as follows:  
- a cluster member node (CM) senses and transmits data 
- an aggregator node (AG) controls member nodes and senses, 
collects, aggregates, analyses and transmits data 
- a base station (BS) controls the system and collects, 
analyses, transmits and stores data. 
   For the purposes of an attack situation in which nodes can be 
lost or compromised, detection and recovery can only take place 
efficiently if the network can function as normally as possible. We 
propose to therefore retain connectivity and maximize flexibility 
in the network. This is achieved by allowing each node to play the 
role of either a member or aggregator node as appropriate under 
the conditions arising, and at the same time, for the entire network 
to efficiently re-organize itself in order to remain connected when 
a node compromise is detected.  
Thus, all nodes must assume the functions of a member node 
while aggregator nodes, in addition, take on the responsibility of 
coordinating the sensing activities in their neighbouring region 
(also known as a sensing zone) and aggregate and forward the 
information to the base station. The task of coordination is not a 
simple one and it is also not a short term job. In order to provide 
instantaneous sensing and reporting capability (dependent upon 
sensing applications) each aggregator node may need to 
systematically rotate its responsibilities transparently among 
neighbouring nodes without much communication overhead.    
B. 7BRecovery Model 
In this paper, our focus is on recovery from a node 
compromise. We assume that a node compromise in the network 
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 has been detected and the extent of damage is known. Our 
objective is to implement speedy recovery.  
We identify three stages within our recovery model. The first 
is detection of an attack or node compromise, the second is 
response to this, and the third is recovery from it. Each stage 
employs different strategies and methods. There are a number of 
procedures available in the literature for detection of attacks.  We 
propose the use of authentication procedures and voting 
algorithms for detection purposes.  All code updates and 
reclustering /reprogramming commands are authenticated and 
supported by a lightweight authentication protocol that uses a 
shared secret between the base station and each sensor device and 
a hash function (we propose the use of SHA-1 or Rabin). A 
detailed security analysis of the authentication protocols for 
supporting network reclustering and node reprogramming is 
presented in our previous work [15]. The authentication protocol 
ensures that malicious nodes cannot compromise the reclustering 
or reprogramming process.  
Since the focus of this paper is not on detection, we refer the 
reader to Chapter 17 of [14] for an overview of recent papers 
applicable to the low resource sensor networks. At the end of the 
detection phase we assume that compromised nodes have been 
identified.   
In the response stage, we initiate reclustering procedures to 
reorganize the network excluding compromised nodes hence 
allowing the network to stay operational during the node recovery 
phase. This is critical as nodes that have been compromised may 
be beyond recovery and hence should be excluded from the 
network at the earliest so as to minimize the impact of the 
compromise on normal network operation.   
The final stage is recovery and we attempt to recover 
compromised nodes through reprogramming. Once successfully 
reprogrammed, the nodes can again join existing clusters and 
resume normal operation. However, if reprogramming is 
impossible, the nodes are deleted from the network. Further, to 
ensure security robustness, we take the additional step of limiting 
the role of a compromised AG node to that of a member node in 
the reclustered network. 
WSNs configured in this way will be able to implement 
recovery more quickly than WSNs which are not. This is because 
it is possible to employ a localized approach, cluster by cluster, in 
detecting, responding to and recovering from an attack. The 
detailed description of self-organization and the cluster building 
are provided in the next section.  
C. 8BRe-Clustering Algorithm  
Our re-clustering algorithm exploits the self-organization 
capabilities of the WSN to achieve   a specific target structure to 
optimize the recovery process. We propose a decentralized 
approach to node configuration with the following target 
conditions: 
•  each node be no more than two hops away from an 
aggregator node,  
• the aggregator set be connected enabling transmission of 
data along the aggregators to the base station, and 
• some AG be one hop away from the BS. 
The connectedness of the WSN to the BS in order to ensure 
regular operation of the data sensing tasks is assured by the 
connectedness of all nodes through the AGs. In addition, we aim 
for energy-efficiency by choosing aggregators with high battery 
energy levels.  
Fig. 1 illustrates the topology of the envisioned WSN. It 
comprises a number of low-resource sensor nodes that are 
connected to a base station (BS) in order to analyze the sensed 
data. By partitioning the WSN topology into a set of clusters, a 
hierarchical network topology is obtained that is power-efficient, 
scalable, and resilient to security attacks.  
Each cluster comprises one AG and several cluster members 
(CMs). Each CM is always connected to a single associated AG to 
exchange data and control packets. The communication between 
CMs and the AG is controlled by establishing synchronization 
between the involved nodes and using a cyclic superframe 
structure of length tP as proposed for example in [12]. At the 
beginning of a superframe, the AG sends a beacon message to 
wake-up sleeping CMs and coordinate the intra-cluster 
communication within the active period of the superframe in a 
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) based manner. During 
the inactive period of the superframe, CMs are sent to sleep to 
preserve battery energy. An AG aggregates the data sensed by the 
CMs of its cluster and transmits the aggregated data to the BS. For 
this purpose, AGs are connected among each other to form an 
overlay network that manages itself in a distributed fashion. The 
AGs communicate with each other by using a CSMA/CA 
Medium-Access Control (MAC) scheme and employing 
multi-hop packet transmissions. Therefore, AGs also act as relays 
to forward packets on behalf of other aggregators to the BS.  
For this purpose, each node v broadcasts a HELLO message at 
a random time instant within the superframe time interval tP. Each 
message carries the ID of the transmitting node v, the IDs of all 
currently known 1-hop neighbors of the transmitting node, and the 
metric values M that characterize the capabilities of the node v and 
its neighbors to act as an AG.  
The metric M(v) of node v is defined as  
maxmax
)()1()()(
d
vda
e
veavM −+= ,  a ∈ [0,1], 
where e is the available battery energy of the node and emax its 
maximum value, d is the node degree that should not exceed a 
pre-defined value dmax, and a is a pre-defined weighting 
parameter. 
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 To successfully distribute all neighborhood information between 
the involved network nodes, broadcasting of HELLO messages 
has to be repeated with the updated neighbor node list and metric 
values in at least two succeeding time intervals tP. After the 
exchange of the HELLO messages, each node v knows the IDs of 
all 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors, the connectivity between these 
nodes, and their corresponding metric values M. We denote the set 
of all 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors as N1(v) and N 2(v), respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Multi-Point Relay (MPR) Selection 
After collecting the neighborhood information, each node v 
selects a set of multi-point relays that can be viewed as candidate 
AGs. This set comprises a small subset of nodes C(v) from the 
1-hop neighbor set N1(v) of node v that fully covers the 2-hop 
neighbor set  N2(v) of node v. C(v) is thus also called the coverage 
set of node v, and it can be shown that the C(v)∪ v forms a CDS 
for N2(v). The coverage set C(v) is obtained by executing the 
modified EMPR algorithm given below that takes into account the 
known metric values M of the involved network nodes. Those 
nodes with larger metrics are the favoured candidates for AGs. 
This preferential choice is employed in the modified EMPR 
algorithm.  
The Modified Enhanced Multi-Point Relaying Algorithm  
1. Add all free neighbors of N1(v) to the coverage set C(v). 
Node u is a free neighbor of v if v is not the highest metric 
neighbor of u.  
2. Add node u∈ N1(v) to the coverage set C(v), if there is an 
uncovered node in N2(v) that is only covered by u. Any 
node in N2(v) that is not covered by C(v) is called an 
uncovered node. 
3. Add node u∈ N1(v) to the coverage set C(v), if u covers the 
largest number of uncovered nodes in N2(v). Use metric M 
of the nodes to break a tie when two nodes cover the same 
number of uncovered nodes.  
4. Repeat step 3 until all nodes in N2(v) are covered. 
After the multi-point relays have been selected, each node 
broadcasts its coverage set C(v) to its 1-hop neighbors at a random 
time instant in the next time interval tP. 
U3)   Cluster Forming 
A node v decides to act as a AG if it has never been 
compromised, and  
1. it has a larger metric M(v) than all its 1-hop neighbors and 
has at least two unconnected neighbors, or if 
2. it is in the coverage set formed by its neighbor with the 
largest metric M. 
When the nodes have decided on their role in the network, the 
AGs broadcast their newly accepted role to its 1–hop neighbors at 
random time instants in the next time interval tP. After a CM has 
received this status message from all candidate AGs in its 
neighborhood, the CM selects the best-suited AG by sending to it 
an associate-request message. The AG acknowledges successful 
association with an associate-confirm message. The cluster 
forming process is completed after all nodes in the network have 
taken on their appropriate roles in the network.  
  The proposed hierarchical network topology offers several 
significant advantages compared to a flat topology in terms of 
network energy consumption and recovery from network security 
attacks. Using a clustered topology reduces the energy 
consumption in the network because, firstly, CMs can transmit 
with a lower power than AGs and, secondly, CMs can sleep while 
the AGs manage and control the network. Moreover, AGs can 
aggregate data before forwarding the aggregated data which in 
turn reduces the overall size of the relayed packets to the BS. 
Using a clustered topology also helps to recover faster and more 
reliably from node compromise on the WSN. Recovery from 
security attacks on one or several CMs can be locally performed 
by the associated AG without affecting the operation of other 
clusters, while recovery from security attacks on AGs or several 
CMs belonging to separate clusters requires cooperation of all 
AGs in the WSN. 
IV. 3BEXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We have implemented a WSN testbed with Crossbow’s 
TelosB motes [13]. In our testbed, up to 20 sensor nodes were 
located on a regular grid of 10 (5x2), 15 (5x3), and 20 (5x4). The 
closest distance between nodes was set to 1 m and the radio 
transmission range of each node to approximately 1.5 m.  
The proposed recovery mechanism was implemented on a 
TinyOS v2.1 / TelosB programming platform. The metric M was 
always computed with a parameter value a set to 0.5, while the 
values for e(v) and d(v) were pre-specified at each run. Therefore, 
we incorporated both the energy and degree metrics to ensure that 
the AG selection maintains energy-efficiency and network 
connectivity. In our experiments, we ran 15 tests for each network 
size. We considered two cases: (1) energy levels in all nodes are 
the same (i.e., the metric M is fixed), and (2) energy levels across 
nodes are variable (i.e., the metric M is node-dependent). Further, 
Figure 1: Clustered Topology of Wireless Sensor Network 
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 since the network topology is fixed, the node degree does not vary 
with time.  
The focus of the experiments was to test the performance of 
the reclustering and reprogramming methods with respect to fast 
recovery from security attacks, while at the same time 
maintaining reasonable battery energy levels. In our experiments, 
we assumed that the network is capable of detecting compromised 
nodes, and any compromised node which cannot be recovered 
will be deleted from the re-clustered network. We assessed the 
performance of our method by measuring the following 
performance metrics: 
• Average clustering time: Average time for reclustering to be 
completed; the clustering time for each run is calculated from the 
time the base station issues a ‘recluster’ command to the time that 
all nodes are included in a cluster.  
• Average battery energy level of all WSN aggregators. 
• Average battery energy level of all WSN cluster members.  
In addition, we also recorded the number of aggregators 
elected by the algorithm. The expected number of aggregators for 
a given network varies with the number of nodes in the network as 
shown through simulations in [8].  
Table I shows the performance results of the reclustering 
algorithm. In terms of number of aggregators elected, these results 
compare well with the simulations of Wu [8], in which the 
transmission range is relatively high compared to the density of 
the nodes in the WSN. Wu’s work, however, assumes no 
collisions, while in our implementation one node per run was lost 
on average either because of collisions or because of 
data-gathering errors when 1- and 2-hop neighbor tables were 
being compiled.  
 
TABLE I.     PERFORMANCE OF THE RE-CLUSTERING ALGORITHM 
Network Size Clustering time (secs) Std. Dev. (secs) 
Average no. of 
AGs 
10 nodes 162 1.49 2
15 nodes 167 1.42 3
20 nodes 175 1.47 5
 
Table II shows the average metric value per network versus 
that of the selected aggregators. In calculating M(v), floating point 
errors were avoided by using M’(v)=e(v)d max+d(v) e max. The 
results prove the energy efficiency of the proposed clustering 
method as the average energy levels of AGs is above that of 
cluster members across the network. Further, we note that the 
proposed method works on localized (2-hop) information to form 
clusters. This ensures that the method is scalable and the 
clustering times obtained for the 10, 15 and 20 node networks 
prove this.  
 
TABLE II.    ENERGY LEVELS OF CLUSTERS AND AGGREGATORS 
Network Size 
M(v) 
(average) 
M(v) for AGs (average) 
10 nodes 5.5 5.6
15 nodes 8 8.25
20 nodes 10.5 13.95
 
In a large scale sensor network, energy-efficiency techniques 
will limit the number of active nodes to a subset of all nodes such 
that the network area is fully covered and the network remains 
fully connected. This observation means that the number of active 
two-hop neighbours for a given node will tend to remain fairly 
constant. This in conjunction with the two-hop localised nature of 
the reclustering algorithm will ensure that the reclustering time 
remains fairly constant and is independent of the total number of 
nodes in the network as only active nodes will participate in the 
reclustering process. However, we do note that since a command 
to re-cluster from the BS is passed through AGs to nodes which 
are not necessarily in range of the BS, this transmission time is 
likely to increase as the network grows while the clustering time 
remains fairly stable. As a result, the overall re-clustering time is 
likely to increase at most logarithmically in network size. While 
our data is insufficient to confirm this, the results in Table I 
indicate that this bound is reasonable. 
One of the important differentiators between our work and that 
of Wu [8] is that the set of chosen aggregators will vary over time 
as we take into account the state of individual sensors with respect 
to their energy levels and node degree. This is especially useful 
because the number of active nodes available to join a cluster 
diminishes with time as nodes lose all energy or are compromised 
beyond recovery. It is also useful in terms of the proposed scheme 
being extensible to mobile sensor networks where each sensor 
will have a periodically changed node degree.  
Table III shows the results for the reprogramming tests using 
the modified Deluge method. Deluge is a reliable data 
dissemination protocol for large objects, such as program 
binaries. Together with a bootloader, Deluge provides a way to 
reprogram sensor motes in a network. Since Deluge only supports 
network-wide reprogramming, we modified the dissemination 
engine of the protocol to individually address sensor nodes. This 
was done by replacing the AM_BROADCAST_ADDR parameter 
in the engine with the node-id of the node to be recovered. This 
modification allowed Deluge to disseminate the program binary 
to a specific compromised node. The performance tests were 
conducted using similar network topologies to the reclustering set 
up. However, for reprogramming, we assume that each node in the 
WSN is within range of the BS, while the converse is not 
necessarily the case. This is a much stronger assumption than that 
needed for re-clustering. In the tests, the base station issued a 
reprogramming command to a single compromised node that was 
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 chosen at random in the network. Reprogramming time was 
calculated from the time the command was issued by the base 
station to when the node was fully functional. The results have 
been obtained by averaging over 15 runs with the compromised 
node being chosen at random from the network. Table III 
indicates no impact on reprogramming time as a function of 
network size. 
Based on the observed reprogramming and reclustering times, 
we propose that network wide reclustering is triggered only when 
an AG node is compromised. In the event of a member node being 
compromised, recovery can be restricted to isolating the node and 
reprogramming without the need for reclustering. Such an 
approach is both energy-efficient and minimizes the disruption of 
normal network operation. 
TABLE III.    REPROGRAMMING TIME USING MODIFIED DELUGE 
Network 
Size 
Mean time 
(secs) 
Std. Dev
10 nodes 87.67 0.89
15 nodes 87.79 0.94
20 nodes 87.21 0.83
V. 4BCONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel recovery mechanism for 
WSNs that enables fast and reliable recovery from security attacks 
by applying dynamic network reclustering and node 
reprogramming. To identify the best-suited aggregators for the 
reconfigured network, the clustering algorithm incorporates a 
metric that takes into account the energy levels of individual 
sensors as well as their connectivity to other nodes. Since the 
reclustered network does not include compromised nodes, the 
network can be kept operational while the comprised nodes can be 
recovered by executing the node reprogramming procedure. We 
have demonstrated that the proposed recovery mechanism 
comprising reclustering and reprogramming can be efficiently 
implemented on a sensor network testbed using TelosB motes. 
Our experimental results show that our recovery mechanism is 
suitable for low resources sensor devices and efficient both in 
terms of recovery time and scalable due to its decentralized 
approach.  
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